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Abstract
Using duality theory techniques we derive simple, closed-form formulas for bounding the
optimal revenue of a monopolist selling many heterogeneous goods, in the case where the
buyer’s valuations for the items come i.i.d. from a uniform distribution and in the case where
they follow independent (but not necessarily identical) exponential distributions. We apply
this in order to get in both these settings specific performance guarantees, as functions of
the number of items m, for the simple deterministic selling mechanisms studied by Hart and
Nisan [11], namely the one that sells the items separately and the one that offers them all
in a single bundle.
We also propose and study the performance of a natural randomized mechanism for
exponential valuations, called Proportional. As an interesting corollary, for the special
case where the exponential distributions are also identical, we can derive that offering the
goods in a single full bundle is the optimal selling mechanism for any number of items. To
our knowledge, this is the first result of its kind: finding a revenue-maximizing auction in
an additive setting with arbitrarily many goods.
1 Introduction
What selling mechanism should a monopolist with many heterogeneous goods deploy when
facing a buyer, in order to maximize his revenue? The buyer has private valuations for the
items but the seller can only have an incomplete prior knowledge of these values, in the form of
a probability distribution over them. Furthermore, the buyer is strategic and selfish, meaning
that if asked to submit her valuations for the goods she will lie if this is to improve her own
personal gain. This is one of the most fundamental problems in auction theory, and although
it has received a lot of attention from both the Economics and Computer Science communities,
it still remains elusive.
1.1 Related Work
The problem is famous for demonstrating a striking dichotomy; the case of a single good is
fully resolved by the seminal work of Myerson [20]: the optimal selling strategy is to just set a
take-it-or-leave it price for the item, and this price is given by a very simple formula involving
the probability distribution. However, for more goods, in fact even for just two and three
items, our understanding of optimal mechanisms is totally insufficient. The problem seems
to be qualitatively completely different and it is widely believed that no closed-form, elegant
solutions are within reach (see e.g. [18, 5]).
First of all, it is known that in general determinism (i.e. setting selling prices for various
bundles of goods) is not enough any more and that lotteries need to be deployed for optimal-
ity [14, 12, 17, 21, 6]. Manelli and Vincent [17] provide some sufficient conditions for deter-
ministic mechanisms to be optimal, but these are arguably rather involved, so they were able
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to instantiate and verify them only for the case of two and three goods with valuations i.i.d.
according to a uniform distribution. Hart and Nisan [11] have also presented a very simple
sufficient condition, in the special case of two i.i.d. items, for the full-bundle mechanism (that
just sets a single selling price for all the items together) to be optimal and deploy it to show that
this holds for the equal-revenue distribution and, more generally, for all Pareto distributions
with parameter α ≥ 1/2. Finally, Daskalakis et al. [6] have shown that full-bundling is also an
optimal selling strategy for two exponentially i.i.d. goods. Nothing is clearly known in this front
for more than three items or other distributions, apart from the recent work of Giannakopoulos
and Koutsoupias [8] where a closed-form description of a deterministic mechanism that is shown
to be optimal for up to six uniformly i.i.d. items is given, and conjectured that this holds for
any number of goods.
In the current paper we contribute to this line of work, by generalizing the result of [6]
from 2 to any number of goods, showing that determinism is optimal for arbitrarily many
identical valuations distributed according to an exponential distribution, and in fact optimality
is achieved by the simple full-bundling strategy. To our knowledge, this is the first result that
provides specific description of an optimal auction for an arbitrary number of items. In fact,
together with [8], they are the first such results to break the boundary of three items.
This path of discovering “simple” descriptions of optimal selling mechanisms is further being
narrowed by a recent computational hardness result from Daskalakis et al. [5], where it is shown
that even for independent (but not identical) valuations with finite support of size 2, it is #P-
hard to compute exactly the optimal mechanism. However this does not exclude the possibility
of a PTAS and for i.i.d. settings Cai and Huang [2] and Daskalakis and Weinberg [4] have indeed
already provided such efficient algorithmic approximations.
So, given the previous discussion, it is essential to try to approximate the optimal revenue by
selling mechanisms that are as simple as possible. We may lose something with respect to the
total revenue objective, but on the other hand these mechanisms are much easier to understand,
describe, analyze and implement, and such results may in fact enrich our understanding of the
character of exact optimal auctions in general. Hart and Nisan [11] provide such solid and
elegant approximation ratio guarantees (logarithmic with respect to the number of items) that
hold “universally” for all product (independent) distributions, without even assuming standard
regularity conditions (like e.g. in [3, 17, 20]), by studying the two most natural deterministic
mechanisms: the one that treats every item independently and sells them separately to the
buyer and, on the other end, the one that treats all items as a single full bundle. In particular,
they prove an O(log2m)-approximation ratio for the former and, with the extra requirement
of identical distributions, an O(logm)-approximation for the latter, where m is the number of
goods. They also provide slightly improved guarantees for the special case of two i.i.d. goods.
Li and Yao [16] further improved their results, by bringing these down to Θ(logm) and Θ(1)
respectively, which are also proved to be tight up to constants1.
In this paper we try to specialize these general probabilistic results for the case of specific
“canonical” distributions, namely the uniform and exponential ones, and we show that by doing
so one can get good constant-factor, almost optimal in many cases, performance guarantees.
Furthermore, in keeping up with the spirit of the line of work that studies simple but still well-
performing mechanisms we also propose a very natural randomized mechanism for exponential
distributions and provide good approximation guarantees for it.
Daskalakis et al. [6] and Giannakopoulos and Koutsoupias [8] have developed duality-theory
frameworks for the general problem of multidimensional optimal auctions, the former having a
strong measure-theoretic flavor by using classic results from optimal transport theory combined
with Strassen’s theorem for stochastic dominance, and the latter resembling more in spirit
1In a very exciting recent result, after our paper was first made publicly available, Babaioff et al. [1] showed
that combining these two simple selling mechanisms one can guarantee a constant approximation ratio of 6 by
just assuming independence of the item valuations. Yao [23] generalized their results to multi-bidder settings.
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traditional linear programming theory formulations.
1.2 Our Results and Techniques
Our model is the standard single-buyer multi-item additive valuations Bayesian model of McAfee
and McMillan [19] which is used in many other works [17, 11, 6, 16]. Critical to the exposition
is the analytical characterization of truthfulness through subgradients of convex functions given
by Rochet [22].
Inspired by the elegant approach of Hart and Nisan [11], we take the opposite direction
to their universal approximation guarantees for general independent distributions, and try to
give better, specialized bounds for the case of uniform and exponential distributions. Our
main strategy is driven by the standard technique in approximation algorithms, to use weak-
duality from traditional linear programming to upper-bound the optimal objective and then
use this to calculate approximation upper bounds for particular algorithms. Since the optimal
revenue problem cannot be fully captured by means of traditional combinatorial LPs, we use
the duality-theory framework developed in [8]. In particular, we use the weak-duality theorem
(see Theorem 1) in order to get specific closed-form bounds for our settings (Theorems 2 and 3),
by constructing and plugging-in appropriate feasible dual solutions (Theorems 4 and 5). This
is the most technical part of the paper. This technique is completely different to previous
results on approximate mechanisms for the problem which rely entirely on probabilistic analysis
methods (e.g. the core-tail decomposition of [16]). Our bounds on the optimal revenue are
very simple expressions, depending on the number of items m. We believe that, given how
notoriously difficult is the problem of exactly determining the optimal revenue, coming up with
such formulas is a very useful tool for (approximate) auction analysis, and is of its own interest.
By comparing these bounds to the revenue obtained by the simple mechanisms studied in
Hart and Nisan [11] we are able to give closed-form approximation guarantees with respect to
the number of items m, in both settings that we are interested in: for the case of i.i.d. uniform
distributions (see Fig. 1) over the unit interval we show that selling the items separately is loosely
2-approximate and that selling in a full-bundle always performs better and is asymptotically
optimal; for independent (and not necessarily identical) exponential distributions (see Fig. 3)
we give a closed-form formula upper bound (27) for selling separately that can be loosely upper-
bounded by e ≈ 2.7.
Furthermore, if the exponential distributions are in addition identical, then we can show
(Theorem 7) that selling deterministically in a full-bundle is optimal, for any number of goods.
We derive this optimality as a side result of the analysis of a very simple and natural ran-
domized selling mechanism that we propose for the setting of independent (but not necessarily
identical) exponential valuations. We call it Proportional (Definition 1) and allocates the
items somehow proportionally with respect to every item’s exponential distribution parameter.
We compute the expected revenue of this mechanism (Theorem 6) and using again the optimal
revenue bounds derived earlier, we show that Proportional’s approximation ratio is at most
equal to the ratio between the maximum and minimum parameters of the independent expo-
nential distributions. For i.i.d. settings, this ratio is of course equal to 1, proving optimality
and Proportional reduces to full-bundling.
A final remark must be made about the choice of uniform and exponential distributions. This
was not random; we wanted to study “canonical” examples of distributions, one for bounded-
interval supports and one having full support [0,∞). The uniform and exponential distributions
are, respectively, the maximum entropy probability distributions for these two settings, intu-
itively being the “natural” choices if one wants to make as few assumptions as possible (see
e.g. [9, Sect. 3.4.3]).
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1.3 Model and Notation
The real unit interval will be denoted by I = [0, 1] and the nonnegative reals by R+ = [0,∞).
We will also use [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m} for any positive integer m. The uniform distribution over
I will be denoted by U and the exponential distribution with parameter λ > 0 by E(λ). Finally,
we use the standard game-theoretic notation x−j = (x1, x2 . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xm) to denote
the resulting vector if we remove x’s j-th coordinate. Then, x = (xj ,x−j).
1.3.1 Mechanisms and Truthfulness
We study an m-goods monopoly setting, where the buyer has a valuation of xj ∈ Dj for good
j. Every Dj = [Lj , Hj ] is a real interval. This valuation is private information to her, and
intuitively represents the amount of money she is willing to pay to get this item. The seller has
only some (incomplete) prior knowledge of the player’s valuation vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm)
in the form of a probability distribution F over D = D1 × · · · ×Dm from which x is sampled.
For the purposes of this paper we will assume that F = F1 × . . . Fm is a product distribution,
i.e. xj ’s follow independent distributions Fj , and also that every Fj has an almost everywhere
(a.e.) differentiable density function fj .
A (direct revelation) selling mechanismM = (a, p) on this setting is a protocol which, after
receiving the buyer’s bid vector x′ as input (the buyer may lie about her true valuations x
and misreport x′ 6= x), decides to sell item j with probability aj(x′) ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ [m], for a
total (for all items) price of p(x′) ∈ R+. If one wants to restrict attention only to deterministic
mechanisms, it is enough to take aj ∈ {0, 1}. However, here we optimize over the general class
of randomized selling mechanisms, i.e. we allow lotteries.
More formally, a mechanism consists of an allocation function a = (a1, a2, . . . , am) : D −→
Im paired with a payment function p : D −→ R+. We consider the buyer having additive
valuations for the items, her “happiness” when she has (true) valuations x and reports x′ to
the mechanism being captured by her utility function
u(x′|x) ≡ a(x′) · x− p(x′) =
m∑
j=1
aj(x
′)xj − p(x′),
the sum of the value she receives from the items she manages to purchase minus the payment
she has to submit to the seller for this purchase. The player is completely rational and selfish,
wanting to maximize her utility and that’s why she will not hesitate to misreport x′ instead of
her private values x if this is to give her a higher utility. The seller’s “happiness” is captured
by the total revenue of the mechanism
p(x′) = a(x′) · x− u(x′|x). (1)
It is standard in Mechanism Design to ask for mechanisms to respect the following two
properties2:
• Individual Rationality (IR): u(x|x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ D.
• Incentive Compatibility (IC): u(x|x) ≥ u(x′|x) for all x,x′ ∈ D.
The IR constraint corresponds to the notion of voluntary participation, that is, the buyer cannot
harm herself by taking part in the auction, while IC captures the fundamental property that
truth-telling is a dominant strategy for the buyer in the underlying game, i.e. she will never
2We must mention here that these assumptions will be without loss to our revenue maximization objective,
due to the celebrated Revelation Principle (see e.g. [20]). However, they help as simplify substantially the search
for optimal selling mechanisms by narrowing the focus to truthful ones, under which we don’t have to worry
about the players’ complex strategic behavior and the underlying game-theoretic equilibria.
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receive a better utility by lying about her true bid. Mechanisms that satisfy IC are also called
truthful. From now on we will focus on truthful IR mechanisms, and so we will relax notation
u(x′|x) to just u(x), considering buyer’s utility as a function u : D −→ R+.
Rochet [22] gave a very elegant analytic characterization of truthful mechanisms (see e.g.
[11] for a proof): u must be a convex function with the allocation function a being its sub-
gradient; ∂u(x)∂xj = aj(x) for all items j ∈ [m] and a.e. x ∈ D. This essentially establishes a
correspondence between truthful mechanisms and utility functions. Not only does every selling
mechanism induce a well-defined utility function for the buyer, but also conversely, given a non-
negative convex function that satisfies these two properties we can fully recover a corresponding
mechanism from the allocation-derivative equality and (1).
1.3.2 Optimal Selling Mechanisms
This paper studies the problem of maximizing the expected seller’s revenue based on his prior
knowledge of distribution F , given the IR and IC constraints, thus (by (1) and the subgradient
characterization) maximizing
E
x∼F
[p(x)] =
∫
D
(∇u(x) · x− u(x)) dF (x) (2)
over the space of nonnegative convex functions u on D having the property
0 ≤ ∂u(x)
∂xj
≤ 1
for a.e. x ∈ D and all j ∈ [m].
Following the notation in [11], we will denote by R(u;F ) the expected revenue in (2). The
optimal revenue isRev(F ) ≡ supuR(u;F ), i.e. the maximum revenue among all feasible truthful
mechanisms. A mechanism inducing utility u for which R(u;F ) = Rev(F ) will be called an
optimal mechanism.
Notice that for single-dimensional F ’s, i.e. settings with a single good, the seminal work of
Myerson [20] has fully settled the question of determining optimal auctions and the optimal
revenue (see e.g. [15]):
Rev(F ) = max
p
p(1− F (p)) (3)
obtained by the deterministic mechanism that sets a selling (take-it-or-leave-it) price threshold
of p (p = argmaxp p(1 − F (p))). For example, if F ∼ U then F (x) = x and f(x) = 1 and so
by (3) we can easily compute Rev(U) = 14 , achieved by the optimal mechanism that sets a
selling price of 12 . Also, for the exponential distribution E(λ) we have F (x) = 1 − e−λx and
f(x) = λe−λx for x ∈ R+ and so Rev(E(λ)) = 1λe for a selling price of 1λ .
Finally, let us also provide some notation from [11] for the revenue of two simple deterministic
selling mechanisms for the m-items setting which are of great importance to us throughout this
paper, namely the one which sells every item separately to the buyer and that which sells all
items in a full bundle:
SRev(F ) ≡ Rev(F1) +Rev(F2) + · · ·+Rev(Fm) (4)
BRev(F ) ≡ Rev(F1 ∗ F2 ∗ · · · ∗ Fm),
respectively3. In particular, if Fj ∼ U for all j ∈ [m], we have
SRev(Um) =
m
4
and BRev(Um) = sup
x∈[0,m]
x(1− FS(x)), (5)
3F1 ∗ F2 ∗ · · · ∗ Fm is the convolution of distributions F1, F2, . . . , Fm, i.e. if Xj ∼ Fj are the random variables
representing the items’ valuations, then F1 ∗ F2 ∗ · · · ∗ Fm = FS is the distribution of the sum of the valuations,
S =
∑m
j=1Xj .
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where FS is the cdf of the Irwin-Hall distribution of the sum of m independent uniform random
variables over I, i.e. [10]
FS(x) =
1
m!
bxc∑
k=0
(−1)k
(
m
k
)
(x− k)m, 0 ≤ x ≤ m. (6)
In the same way, for independent exponential distributions and for i.i.d. exponential distribu-
tions, we can see that
SRev(E) = 1
e
m∑
j=1
1
λj
and SRev(Em(λ)) = m
λe
, (7)
where we use the shorthand notation E = E(λ1)× · · · × E(λm).
2 Weak Duality
Define VD,F = V to be the family of allm-dimensional functions z = (z1, z2, . . . , zm) : D −→ Rm+ ,
such that every zj is integrable and also absolutely continuous with respect to its j-th coordinate,
and which satisfy the following conditions a.e. in D:
zj(Lj ,x−j) ≤ Ljf(Lj ,x−j) for all j ∈ [m] (8)
zj(Hj ,x−j) ≥ Hjf(Hj ,x−j) for all j ∈ [m] (9)
m∑
j=1
∂zj(x)
∂xj
≤ (m+ 1)f(x) + x · ∇f(x). (10)
Then, we know from the duality framework developed in [8] that the optimal revenue can be
bounded by the following quantity:
Theorem 1 (Weak Duality). For every m-dimensional interval D and probability distribution
F over D,
Rev (F ) ≤ inf
z∈V
∫
D
m∑
j=1
zj(x) dx. (11)
We will feel free to refer to z ∈ V as feasible dual solutions, constraints (8)–(10) as dual
constraints and to the above critical quantity infz∈V
∫
D
∑
j zj(x) dx as dual objective. The ties
to the terminology of classical linear programming duality are obvious.
Since we are particularly interested in providing upper bounds for the optimal revenue in
the case of independent uniform and exponential valuations, we specialize Theorem 1 in these
cases, for ease of reference and a more clear exposition:
Theorem 2 (Weak Duality for Uniform Distributions). The dual constraints (8)–(10) for the
m-items uniform i.i.d. setting over Im become:
zj(0,x−j) = 0 for all j ∈ [m] (12)
zj(1,x−j) ≥ 1 for all j ∈ [m] (13)
m∑
j=1
∂zj(x)
∂xj
≤ m+ 1, (14)
and the dual objective upper-bounds optimal revenue:
Rev (Um) ≤
m∑
j=1
∫
Im
zj(x) dx. (15)
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Intuitively, for each item j there is a dual function zj that, if viewed as a single dimensional
function zj(∗,x−j) of just the j-th coordinate, it has to start with the value of 0 at the left
boundary of the unit interval I (condition (12)), travel all the way up to a value of 1 at the
end of the interval (condition (13)), but with a speed that is never too high: the sum of the
derivatives of all zj ’s must not exceed m + 1 at any point of the domain (condition (14)). At
the same time, in order to get good bounds on the optimal revenue, these functions must stay
as low as possible, so that they minimize the total volume under their curves (expression (15)).
These are two contradicting objectives, and finding the right balance between them is the very
essence of this duality method.
Theorem 3 (Weak Duality for Exponential Distributions). The dual constraints (8)–(10) for
the m-items independent exponential setting (with parameters λ1, λ2, . . . , λm) become:
zj(0,x−j) = 0 for all j = 1, 2, . . . ,m (16)
m∑
j=1
∂zj(x)
∂xj
≤ λ (m+ 1− w) e−w, (17)
where w =
∑m
j=1 λjxj, λ =
∏m
j=1 λj and the dual objective upper-bounds optimal revenue:
Rev (E) ≤
m∑
j=1
∫
Rm+
zj(x) dx. (18)
3 Uniform Domains
Theorem 4. The optimal revenue from selling m goods having uniform i.i.d. valuations
over the unit interval is at most
m(1 +m2)
2(1 +m)2
.
Proof. Let
Im ≡ {v = (v1, v2, . . . , vm) | vj ∈ {0, 1} , j ∈ [m]}
be the set of nodes of the m-dimensional unit hypercube and for every node v ∈ Im define Lv
to be the following subspace of Im:
Lv =
{
x ∈ Im
∣∣∣∣ xj ∈ [0, 1m+ 1
]
if vj = 0 and xj ∈
(
1
m+ 1
, 1
]
if vj = 1, j ∈ [m]
}
A simple observation is that Lv’s form a valid partition of I
m, i.e.
v,v′ ∈ Im ∧ v 6= v′ =⇒ Lv ∩ Lv′ = ∅ and
⋃
v∈Im
Lv = I
m
Now we are going to construct a feasible dual solution, that is, valid zj ’s, to plug them into
Theorem 2. Fix some j ∈ [m] and a subspace Lv ⊆ Im (by fixing a v = (v1, v2, . . . , vm) ∈ Im)
and define zj : Lv −→ R+ as follows:
• If vj = 0, set zj(x) = 0 for all x ∈ Lv.
• Otherwise, i.e. if vj = 1, set
zj(x) = max
{
0,
m+ 1
k
(xj − ck)
}
=
{
0, if 1m+1 < xj ≤ ck,
m+1
k (xj − ck), if ck < xj ≤ 1,
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for all x ∈ Lv, where
k = k(v) =
m∑
j=1
vj and ck = 1− k
m+ 1
.
By this construction, and by letting v range over Im, we have a well defined function zj : Im −→
R+. Each x ∈ [0, 1]m belongs to a unique partition Lv (corresponding to a unique v = v(x)),
thus also well defining k = k(x). So, the above definition can be written more compactly as
zj(x) =
{
0, if 0 < xj ≤ ck,
m+1
k (xj − ck), if ck < xj ≤ 1.
It is easy to check, directly from this definition, that
zj(0, x−j) = 0 and zj(1, x−j) = 1 (19)
for all j = 1, 2, . . . ,m and x−j ∈ Im−1 and also that
∂zj(x)
∂xj
=
{
0, if 0 < xj ≤ ck,
m+1
k , if ck < xj ≤ 1.
(20)
Furthermore, if we fix some x ∈ Im (and thus also fix the corresponding, well-defined,
v = v(x) ∈ Im and k =
∑m
j=1 vj), we see from property (20) above that
m∑
j=1
∂zj(x)
∂xj
≤
m∑
j=1
vj
m+ 1
k
=
m+ 1
k
m∑
j=1
vj = m+ 1. (21)
But now we can see that Eqs. (19) and (21) are exactly properties (12), (13) and (14).
The last remaining step of the proof is to evaluate the dual objective and show that∫
Im
m∑
j=1
zj(x) dx =
m(1 +m2)
2(1 +m)2
,
which we do in Appendix B.
Theorem 4 combined with (5) immediately gives us the following approximation ratio bound
for the simple deterministic mechanism that sells the items separately:
Rev(Um)
SRev(Um) ≤ 2
1 +m2
(1 +m)2
< 2. (22)
A plot of this approximation ratio for the values of m = 1, 2, . . . , 100 can be found in Fig. 1,
drawn with blue color. In the same way, using the other expression of (5) together with (6) we
get a bound for the approximation ratio of the deterministic full bundle mechanism, which is
asymptotically optimal:
Rev(Um)
BRev(Um) ≤
m(1 +m2)
2(1 +m)2 supx∈[0,m] x
(
1− 1m!
∑bxc
k=0(−1)k
(
m
k
)
(x− k)m
) → 1, (23)
as m→∞. A plot of this approximation ratio for the values of m = 1, 2, . . . , 100 can be found
in Fig. 1, drawn with red color. Notice how full bundling outperforms selling separately for any
number of goods m.
8
mRev(Um)
SRev(Um)
Rev(Um)
BRev(Um)
50 75 10025
2
1.1
1.4
1.7
Figure 1: The approximation ratio bounds for the uniform i.i.d. separate and full-bundle selling
mechanisms in (22) and (23).
Discussion of Theorem 4 We must mention here that one can trivially get an upper bound
of m2 for the optimal revenue Rev(Um), which is close to that given by Theorem 4: simply
observe that by the IR constraint the seller cannot expect to extract more revenue than the
buyer’s surplus, i.e. the sum of the item valuations
∑m
j=1 xj , which for the uniform distribution
has an expectation of m2 . The two bounds are equal in the limit as the number of items grows
large, however the one in Theorem 4 still gives an improvement by a factor of (m+1)
2
m2+1
, which
especially for a small number of goods, is not insignificant. Notice that, due to the Law of Large
Numbers, the optimal revenue as m → ∞ will anyway tend to the expected full surplus, not
only for the uniform distribution, but for any kind of independently distributed items4.
From that perspective, we believe that it is interesting to get bounds on the optimal revenue
other than the trivial ones derived from using the above surplus-bound argument. To our knowl-
edge Theorem 4 is the first such result in the literature. But, probably even more important
than the improvement in the bound’s value itself, is the underlying technique of providing ex-
plicit feasible dual solutions to plug into Theorem 1: this can give new insights in the structure
of good approximations of the optimal revenue, something which is known to be particularly
difficult for our problem. To demonstrate this, consider for example the case of just two goods
(m = 2) with valuations drawn uniformly from I. The dual program (12)–(14) essentially asks
to allocate a total available value of 3 among the derivatives of z1 and z2 over I
2 in a way that
these functions start at 0 and grow up above 1 at the boundary of I. On one hand there is the
trivial way to do that, simply allocating the total weight equally: ∂z1(x)∂x1 =
∂z2(x)
∂x2
= 32 for all
x ∈ I2; this is clearly a suboptimal solution, since the functions end up reaching a value of 32 at
the boundary’s end, way above 1. On the other hand, there is the optimal way to do it, given
in [7] (see Fig. 2b). However, this construction is rather involved and very difficult to general-
ize, and in fact only existential proofs of optimality are know for more goods, and only up to 6
items. So, it seems essential to find some middle ground within these two extremes, providing
a good approximation to the optimal revenue but also still being simple enough to generalize
for any number of items m. This is exactly what the construction of the dual solutions in the
proof of Theorem 4 provides. A demonstration is given in Fig. 2 for the case of two goods.
4For more on this, see the discussion in [11]. This is the reason why, as Hart and Nisan [13] state, for our
problem “the difficult case is when there is more than one but not too many goods”.
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x2
x10 1
1
(3
2
, 3
2
)
z 1
=
0
z2 = 0
z 1
=
3/
2
z2 = 3/2
(a) Trivial solution
x2
x10 1
1
2
3
2
3
x
1 +
x
2 =
4− √
23
(3
2
, 3
2
)
(3− 3√
2
, 3√
2
)
(3, 0)
(3, 0)
( 3√
2
, 3− 3√
2
)(0, 3)(0, 3)
(0, 3)
(3, 0)
(0, 3)(3, 0)
(0, 0)
z1 = z2 = 0
z 1
=
0
z2 = 0
z 1
=
1
z2 = 1
(b) Optimal solution
x2
x10 1
1
2
3
2
3
1
3
1
3
(32,
3
2)
(3, 0)
(0, 3)
(0, 0)
z1 = z2 = 0
z 1
=
0
z2 = 0
z 1
=
1
z2 = 1
(c) The solution in Theorem 4
Figure 2: Different feasible dual solutions z1, z2 for two goods with uniform valuations over
[0, 1], given by their critical derivatives
(
∂z1(x1,x2)
∂x1
, ∂z2(x1,x2)∂x2
)
.
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4 Exponential Domains
In the following, for m positive integer and w ∈ R+ we will denote the (upper) incomplete
Gamma function by
Γ (m,w) ≡
∫ ∞
w
tm−1e−t dt = (m− 1)!e−w
m−1∑
k=0
wk
k!
and define
g(m,w) = Γ (m+ 1, w)− (m+ 1)Γ (m,w). (24)
Function g is continuous and has a unique root with respect to variable w ∈ R+. Let’s denote
this root by γ∗m. In fact, γ∗m ∈ (0,m + 1) and also g(m,w) > 0 for all w ∈ (γ∗m,∞). So, the
following function on the positive integers is well defined and nonnegative:
G(m) ≡
∫ ∞
0
max{0, g(m,w)} dw =
∫ ∞
γ∗m
g(m,w) dw = γ∗mΓ (m, γ
∗
m) = γ
∗
m
m+1e−γ
∗
m . (25)
A detailed proof of all the above properties of function g(m,w) and calculations can be found
in Appendix A.
Theorem 5. The optimal revenue from selling m goods having independent exponential
valuations (with parameters λ1, λ2, . . . , λm) is at most
G(m)
m!
m∑
j=1
1
λj
,
where G(m) is defined in (25). In the special case of i.i.d. exponential valuations with
parameter λ this becomes
G(m)
(m− 1)!λ.
Proof. We will construct appropriate dual variables zj that satisfy (16) and (17) to plug into
the Weak Duality Theorem 3. For all j = 1, 2, . . . ,m and x ∈ Rm+ we define
zj(x) = max
{
0, λˆxjw
−mg(m,w)
}
=
{
λˆxjw
−mg(m,w), if w ≥ γ∗m
0, otherwise,
where λˆ =
∏m
j=1 λj , w =
∑m
j=1 λjxj and function g(m,w) as defined in (24). The nonnegativity
of the dual variables as well as their absolute continuity is immediate from the properties of
function g(m,w). It is also trivial to see that condition (16) is immediately satisfied by the
definition of zj . Regarding condition (17), for any j ∈ [m] and x ∈ Rm+ such that w ≥ γ∗m we
calculate
∂zj(x)
∂xj
= λˆw−mg(m,w) + λˆxj
∂w−mg(m,w)
∂xj
= λˆw−mg(m,w) + λˆλjxj
∂w−mg(m,w)
∂w
= λˆw−mg(m,w) + λˆλjxj
[
w−m
∂g(m,w)
∂w
−mw−m−1g(m,w)
]
= λˆw−mg(m,w) + λˆλjxj
[
(m+ 1− w)w−1e−w −mw−m−1g(m,w), ]
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so, by summing up we get
m∑
j=1
∂zj(x)
∂xj
= mλˆw−mg(m,w) + λˆw
[
(m+ 1− w)w−1e−w −mw−m−1g(m,w)]
= λˆ(m+ 1− w)e−w.
At the remaining case of w < γ∗m, we have that zj(x) = 0 for all j ∈ [m]. Also, since γ∗m < m+1,
we know that w < m+ 1, so
m∑
j=1
∂zj(x)
∂xj
= 0 < λˆ(m+ 1− w)e−w.
Thus, in any case (17) is satisfied.
Finally, we compute the dual objective value in (18). First notice that
m∑
j=1
zj(x) =
{
λˆw−mg(m,w)
∑m
j=1 xj , if w ≥ γ∗m
0, otherwise.
We perform the following change of variables in the integral:
x1 = t1
w
λ1
, x2 = t2
w
λ2
, . . . , xm−1 = tm−1
w
λm−1
and xm = (1− t1 − t2 − · · · − tm−1) w
λm
(26)
where w =
∑m
j=1 λjxj ∈ R+ and t1, . . . , tm−1 ∈ R+ with 0 ≤ t1 + · · · + tm−1 ≤ 1. Denote this
subspace of Im−1 where tj ’s range by A. The Jacobian of this transformation equals wm−1λˆ and
so the integral in (18) can be written as:∫
Rm+
m∑
j=1
zj(x) dx =
∫ ∞
γ∗m
∫
A
λw−mg(m,w)
m∑
j=1
xj · w
m−1
λˆ
dt1 dt2 . . . dtm−1 dw
=
∫ ∞
γ∗m
g(m,w) dw
∫
A
t1
λ1
+ · · ·+ tm−1
λm−1
+
1− t1 − · · · − tm−1
λm
dt1 . . . dtm−1
= G(m)
∫
A
m−1∑
j=1
(
1
λj
− 1
λm
)
tj +
1
λm
dt1 . . . dtm−1
= G(m)
 1
m!
m−1∑
j=1
(
1
λj
− 1
λm
)
+
1
(m− 1)!λm

=
G(m)
m!
m∑
j=1
1
λj
.
At the third equation above we used the following Lemma describing some known “geometric”
properties of the body A used in the transformation (26).
Lemma 1. For any positive integer m,∫
A
1 dt1 . . . dtm−1 = µ(A) = 1
(m− 1)! and
∫
A
tj dt1 . . . dtm−1 =
1
m!
,
for all j ∈ [m− 1] (where µ denotes the standard Lebesgue measure).
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Figure 3: The approximation ratio bound in (27) for the separate selling mechanism for inde-
pendent exponential valuations.
An immediate result of Theorem 5 combined with formula (7) is that for independent (not
necessarily identical) exponential valuations the approximation ratio of the deterministic mech-
anism that sells items separately is at most
Rev (E)
SRev(E) ≤
G(m)
m!
e < e. (27)
A plot of this approximation ratio G(m)m! e for the values m = 2, 3, . . . , 100 can be found in Fig. 3.
The loose constant factor bound G(m)m! < 1 is straightforward and the proof can be found in
Appendix A.
4.1 A Simple Randomized Selling Mechanism
Consider the following very simple randomized mechanism for the setting of independent expo-
nential valuations with parameters λ1, . . . , λm. Without loss of generality, in the following let’s
assume that λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λm. We will again be using our notation of w =
∑m
j=1 λjxj and
λˆ =
∏m
j=1 λj .
Definition 1 (Mechanism Proportional). Sell item j with probability
λj
λ1
and collect a total
payment of γ∗m/λ1 (parameter γ∗m is defined before (25)).
Essentially we sell the items with probability proportional to their parameters, normalized
by the largest parameter λ1. This mechanism is truthful, because it corresponds to the following
utility function
u(x) = max
{
0, x1 +
λ2
λ1
x2 + · · ·+ λm
λ1
xm − γ
∗
m
λ1
}
which is obviously convex and we will use the shorthand notation
U(w) = u(x) = max
{
0,
w
λ1
− γ
∗
m
λ1
}
(28)
when this is more comfortable. Now let’s compute Proportional’s expected revenue. By (2)
and the fact that fj(xj) = λje
−λjxj this is
λˆ
∫
Rm+
 m∑
j=1
∂u(x)
∂xj
− u(x)
 e−∑mj=1 λjxj dx
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and by a simple integration by parts (see e.g. the derivation in [6, Sect. 2]) this can be written
as
λˆ
∫
Rm+
u(x)
 m∑
j=1
λjxj − (m+ 1)
 e−∑mj=1 λjxj dx = λˆ ∫
Rm+
u(x) (w − (m+ 1)) e−w dx
and by performing the same change of variables as in (26) in the proof of Theorem 5 we get
that Proportional’s expected revenue is
λˆ
∫ ∞
0
∫
A
U(w) (w − (m+ 1)) e−ww
m−1
λ
dw dt1 . . . dtm−1
which equals
1
(m− 1)!
∫ ∞
0
U(w)wm−1 (w − (m+ 1)) e−w dw
by using Lemma 1. Utilizing (30) and taking into consideration that U(0) = 0 and that
limw→∞ g(m,w)U(w) = 0, integrating by parts the revenue becomes
1
(m− 1)!
∫ ∞
0
U ′(w)g(m,w) dw =
1
(m− 1)!
∫ ∞
γ∗m
1
λ1
g(m,w) dw =
G(m)
(m− 1)!λ1 ,
for the first equation using (28). So we showed the following:
Theorem 6. For m goods with independent (but not necessarily identical) exponential
valuations (with parameters λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λm), mechanism Proportional has an
expected revenue of
G(m)
(m− 1)!λ1 ,
where G(m) is defined in (25).
Immediately, by combining Theorem 6 with Theorem 5, we get that Proportional’s
approximation ratio is upper-bounded by
1
m
(
1 +
λ1
λ2
+ · · ·+ λ1
λm
)
≤ max
j
λ1
λj
=
λ1
λm
. (29)
The performance of this approximation ratio bound depends heavily on the choice of the pa-
rameters λj . Obviously, the closer these parameters are the better the bound. However, if
λ1  λm then this ratio can be unbounded. In such a case though, we can fall back to using the
constant approximation separate selling mechanism in (27) which is at most e-approximate. A
very interesting consequence of (29) is for the special case of i.i.d. exponential priors, i.e. when
λ1 = · · · = λm = λ. In that case, by (28) it is straightforward to see that Proportional
reduces to the simple deterministic mechanism that sells all items in a full bundle for a price
of γ∗m/λ and also the approximation ratio in (29) becomes 1, meaning that full bundling is
optimal:
Theorem 7. Selling deterministically in a full bundle5 is optimal for any number of ex-
ponentially i.i.d. goods.
Acknowledgements: I am deeply grateful to Elias Koutsoupias for many useful discussions
and guidance. I also thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the discussion after Theorem 4.
5The optimal bundle price is γ∗m/λ, where λ is the parameter of the exponential distribution and γ
∗
m is given
before (25).
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A Properties of Function g(m,w) of Section 4
Fix some positive integer m. Then g(w) ≡ g(m,w) is an absolutely continuous function on R+
with derivative
g′(w) =
∂Γ (m+ 1, w)
∂w
− (m+ 1)∂Γ (m,w)
∂w
= −w
m
ew
− (m+ 1)
(
−w
m−1
ew
)
= (m+ 1− w)wm−1e−w. (30)
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This means that g(w) is strictly increasing in [0,m + 1] and strictly decreasing in [m + 1,∞).
Also we can compute:
g(m, 0) = Γ (m+ 1, 0)− (m+ 1)Γ (m, 0)
= m!− (m+ 1)(m− 1)! = −(m− 1)! < 0
g(m,m+ 1) = Γ (m+ 1,m+ 1)− (m+ 1)Γ (m,m+ 1)
= (m− 1)!e−(m+1)
[
m
m∑
k=0
(m+ 1)k
k!
− (m+ 1)
m−1∑
k=0
(m+ 1)k
k!
]
= (m− 1)!e−(m+1)
m−1∑
k=0
(
(m+ 1)m
m!
− (m+ 1)
k
k!
)
> 0
lim
w→∞ g(m,w) = 0.
From the above we can deduce that g(w) has a unique root γ∗ in R+. In fact γ∗ ∈ (0,m + 1)
and g(w) < 0 for all w ∈ (0, γ∗) and g(w) > 0 for all w ∈ (γ∗,∞).
Furthermore, we know that the incomplete gamma function has the property
Γ (m+ 1, w) = mΓ (m,w) + wme−w. (31)
With the help of this we can see that∫ ∞
a
Γ (m,w) = [wΓ (m,w)− Γ (m+ 1, w)]∞a
=
[
wΓ (m,w)−mΓ (m,w)− wme−w]∞
a
=
[
(w −m)Γ (m,w)− wme−w]∞
a
= (m− a)Γ (m, a) + ame−a
for any positive integer m and a ∈ R+, so∫ ∞
a
g(m,w) dw =
∫ ∞
a
Γ (m+ 1, w)− (m+ 1)
∫ ∞
a
Γ (m,w)
= (m+ 1− a)Γ (m+ 1, a) + am+1e−a − (m+ 1)(m− a)Γ (m, a)− (m+ 1)ame−a
= (m+ 1− a)(mΓ (m, a) + ame−a)− (m+ 1)(m− a)Γ (m, a) + ame−a(a−m− 1)
= [(m+ 1− a)m− (m+ 1)(m− a)]Γ (m, a)
= aΓ (m, a).
Also due to (31) we get
g(m,w) = Γ (m+ 1, w)− (m+ 1)Γ (m,w)
= mΓ (m,w) + wme−w − (m+ 1)Γ (m,w)
= wme−w − Γ (m,w)
and so, since γ∗ is a root of g(m,w) this means that
Γ (m, γ∗) = (γ∗)me−γ
∗
.
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We will now show the bound G(m)m! < 1 we used in (27). We have:
G(m)
m!
=
γ∗mΓ (m, γ∗m)
m!
from (25)
= e−γ
∗
m
γ∗m
m
m−1∑
k=0
γ∗m
k
k!
< e−γ
∗
m
m−1∑
k=0
γ∗m
k+1
(k + 1)!
since k + 1 ≤ m
< e−γ
∗
m
∞∑
k=0
γ∗m
k
k!
= 1.
B Remaining Computation in the Proof of Theorem 4
∫
Im
m∑
j=1
zj(x) dx =
∑
v∈Im
∫
Lv
m∑
j=1
zj(x) dx
=
∑
v∈Im
∫
Lv
∑
j:vj=1
zj(x) dx
=
m∑
κ=1
∑
v:k(v)=κ
∫
Lv
∑
j:vj=1
zj(x) dx
=
m∑
κ=1
(
m
κ
) ∫ 1
m+1
0
. . .
∫ 1
m+1
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m− κ times
∫ 1
1
m+1
. . .
∫ 1
1
m+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ times
∑
j:vj=1
zj(x) dx
=
m∑
κ=1
(
m
κ
)∫ 1
m+1
0
. . .
∫ 1
m+1
0
∫ 1
1
m+1
. . .
∫ 1
1
m+1
∑
j:vj=1
m+ 1
κ
(xj − ck) dx
=
m∑
k=1
(
m
k
)∫ 1
m+1
0
. . .
∫ 1
m+1
0
∫ 1
1
m+1
. . .
∫ 1
1
m+1
∑
j:vj=1
m+ 1
k
(xj − ck) dx
=
m∑
k=1
(
m
k
)(
1
m+ 1
)m−k
k
∫ 1
1
m+1
. . .
∫ 1
1
m+1
∫ 1
ck
m+ 1
k
(x− ck) dx
=
m∑
k=1
(
m
k
)(
1
m+ 1
)m−k
k
(
1− 1
m+ 1
)k−1 ∫ 1
ck
m+ 1
k
(x− ck) dx
=
m∑
k=1
(
m
k
)
mk−1
(m+ 1)m−2
∫ 1
ck
(x− ck) dx
=
m∑
k=1
(
m
k
)
mk−1
(m+ 1)m−2
(1− ck)2
2
=
1
2(m+ 1)m
m∑
k=1
(
m
k
)
k2mk−1
=
m(1 +m2)
2(1 +m)2
.
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